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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
WILLIAM H. NICHOLSON, JR.*
Injury or Death Resulting from Effort of Employee to Obtain
Relief from Illness or Discomfort
Referring to the conflict of authority as to whether an em-
ployee's injury or death resulting from self-medication or
medication by others during hours of employment is compen-
sable, and expressly refusing to adopt any general rule for
such injuries, the Supreme Court under the particular facts
of Portee, et al. v. South Carolina State Hospital, et al.,1 held
the death of a State Hospital employee compensable. The de-
ceased employee, suffering with a sore throat, had requested
medication of a technician at the hospital and, as had been
done on previous occasions, was administered by this tech-
nician a shot of penicillin. The needle jammed and the tech-
nician was unable to complete the injection. Shortly there-
after the deceased was seized with an attack and died ap-
proximately one hour after receiving the shot, cause of death
being diagnosed as "acute anaphylactic shock caused by pro-
caine penicillin."
Factors favoring compensability pointed out by the Court
were the element of accident in the unexpected result of the
shot and the fact that the purpose of the injection was, not
only to relieve the personal discomfort of the deceased, but
"to ward off any possibility of passing the infection on to
the patients." The fact that the technician customarily gave
such shots outweighed the argument that by rule of the hos-
pital she was permitted to do so only when directed by one
of the physicians, this shot being administered without such
direction. Disobedience of the technician to rules or instruc-
tions was pointed out as one of the risks of employment. Like-
wise, the deceased's error of judgment in consulting this tech-
nician was held not a bar to compensation, in accordance with
the general rule.
*Member of the firm of Nicholson & Nicholson, Greenwood; LL.B.,
1943, University of South Carolina.
1. 234 S. 0. 50, 106 S. E. 2d 670 (1959).
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Aggravation of Varicose Veins
In the case of Richardson v. Wellman Combing Company,
et al.,2 the first claim arising from alleged aggravation of
varicose veins came before the Supreme Court. The claimant
had had the condition of varicose veins for some time, which
condition had deteriorated subsequent to his employment with
the company against which the claim was filed. Approxi-
mately five months after he began working for the company
his legs "cramped" and he became disabled and had to undergo
surgery. The physician's testimony that it was "possible"
that the result was aggravated or accelerated by the em-
ployee's standing on the concrete floor was held insufficient.
The Court's holding states the rule of aggravation of diseased
conditions applied in this state: "their aggravation did not
arise from external force but was caused by the natural re-
sult of preexisting disease." From reviewing the line of cases
on aggravation of diseased conditions, it is not easy at all
times to recognize under the circumstances what will be re-
garded as the necessary "external force." Obviously, the in-
tervening "external force" held absent in this case, if present
in another case of varicose veins, could produce compensa-
bility as in cases of other diseases.
Compensation or Common Law Liability?
Under this heading in the South Carolina Law Quarterly
Vol. 10 No. 1, Fall 1957, the case of Blue Ridge Electric Coop-
erative v. Byrd,3 was discussed, in which the U. S. Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a workman's loss of arms in an ac-
cident while employed by a contractor hired by an electric
power company to extend the company's lines, the company
being authorized to do such work and having done such in
prior years, was compensable; that the power company incur-
red workmen's compensation liability, which remedy was ex-
clusive, the extension of the lines being part of the "usual"
trade or business of the electric company under the provisions
of CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 72-111, 121.
2. 233 S. C. 454, 105 S. E. 2d 602 (1958).
3. 238 F. 2d 346 (4th Cir. 1956).
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SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
Subsequently, this holding of the U. S. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was reversed by the United States Supreme Court on
certiorari, 4 on the grounds that the U. S. Circuit Court should
have ordered a new trial to permit the plaintiff to offer his
own proof on the question of whether the work in which the
plaintiff was injured was a part of the electric company's
trade, business or occupation, according to the Court of Ap-
peal's construction of the South Carolina statute and that,
notwithstanding South Carolina decisions holding that the
question as to whether the electric company is entitled to the
immunity accorded by the South Carolina statute is for the
court and not the jury, on the new trial this question in the
U. S. District Court would be for the jury. The latter holding
was based on the following points: (1) that the state court's
decision of the question of immunity without the aid of a jury
is merely a form and mode of enforcing the immunity-and
not a rule intended to be bound up with the definition of the
right and obligations of the parties so as to come within the
rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins; (2) that the federal policy
against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury rela-
tionship in the federal court should prevail; (3) that, irre-
spective of the policy of following state rules as nearly as pos-
sible in federal courts to assure substantially the same results
in federal and state courts, the result would not necessarily
differ in this case because of the trial judge's power in the
federal system to comment on the weight of the evidence and
the credibility of witnesses with discretion to grant a new
trial if the verdict appears to him to be against the weight of
the evidence.
The case being remanded to the U. S. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, it was held by that Court,5 that the injured employee's
acceptance of compensation from his immediate employer was
not evidential of the scope of the electric company's activities
and thus inadmissible before the jury on retrial of the case
The Court held that this evidence should be admitted by the
trial judge only in order that the record show the immediate
employer's interest in the suit by statutory assignment of ben-
efits,6 unless some other basis is developed for its admission,
4. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative v. Byrd, 356 U. S. 525, 2 L. Ed. 2d
953, 78 Sup. Ct. 893 (1958).
5. 264 F. 2d 689 (1959).
6. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 72-124.
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such as a question of credibility, in which event the Court
must keep the amount of compensation from the jury and in-
struct them as to the limited relevance of the compensation
award to a present recovery.
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